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A commonly held view is that the frequency and value of pre-trial settlements in civil disputes are
greatly influenced by the cost allocation regime that is in place if the case goes to trial.  There is a
large and growing theoretical literature on this subject but almost no empirical evidence. This is
due simply to the scarcity of relevant data owing to the confidentiality generally associated with
such matters. However, the area is an ideal one to analyse experimentally. In this paper we
consider the effect of the British and American rules for cost allocation using such an
experimental methodology. We find that the two rules produce no difference in the frequency of
pre-trial settlements but that the British rule produces higher settlements (pro-pursuer) if the
probability of the pursuer winning is large.
* This research was funded by ESRC research grant No. R000237392.  The authors would like to
thank Michael Bacharach, Ken Binmore, John Hey and Alan Peacock for their helpful comments in
the early stages of this research and Raquel de Pedro and Kathy Mountain for their invaluable
assistance in the running of the experimental sessions.1
1. Introduction
It is possible to view much of what takes place in civil courts as dispute resolution.
There are very large gains to society from an efficient operation of this process. For
those cases that actually go to trial, there is a resolution of a disagreement in a fair and
equitable manner. The vast majority of cases (over 90%) that enter the legal system,
however, settle out of court. But these settlements are greatly influenced by the
procedural framework of the civil justice system. This effect is commonly known as
‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ (Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979)).
Different societies choose different procedural frameworks in which to administer civil
justice. The ‘British’ system is one where, in general, the loser of a case pays the costs
of both parties. The ‘American’ system splits the total costs between both parties
regardless of the outcome, with each side generally paying their own costs. This is a
somewhat stylised view as there are many variations, especially in the USA, but even
within a given tradition there occurs periodic questioning of whether the system could
be organised more efficiently. The deliberations of the Woolf Committee (1995, 1996)
in England and Wales and the Cullen Committee (1995) in Scotland are recent
examples of this. Both authorities have made proposals concerning the rules of
bargaining in pre-trial negotiation. The aim is to bring about more out-of-court
settlements and thus reduce the burden and expense of civil justice.
There has also been an ongoing debate in the USA regarding the relative advantages of
each system of cost allocation.  Olson and Bernstein (1996) report on the most recent
round of policy debate when in 1995 Congress discussed proposals to move to the
British loser-pays rule in certain federal court actions, this having been one the clauses
in the Republican Party’s “Contract with America”.  Leubsdorf (1984) explains just
how the American rule arose more as an arrangement that liberated lawyers in their fee
charging1 than any conscious public policy decision.  Equally, Pfenningstorf (1984)
makes it clear that the distinction between cost-shifting arrangements in the USA and
in Europe is less than clear cut, with European practice varying between countries and
between areas of the law.  There is generally substantial discretion available to courts
in such matters, and in many circumstances the actual extent of cost shifting is
conditioned by qualifications and exceptions to the (British) rule arising from
considerations as to whether the litigation was unprovoked, whether there existed
substantial mutual doubt among the parties regarding the facts or the law, actions
among relations, matters not subject to party disposition (e.g., no-fault divorce), and
so on.  There are also widespread qualifications regarding the determination of
reimbursable costs in terms of either defining classes of “necessary costs”, or
enumerating specific cost items as allowed, or relying on regulated amounts payable
for items.  In most jurisdictions, the exact line between the American rule and the
British rule is a moveable one, and its location is as open to debate in Europe as it is in
the USA2
                                                       
1 There having originally been a practice of setting lawyers fees by statute, as the American Colonies
could not justify the complexity of the English system of taxation of chargeable costs by the court.
2 Pfenningstorf (1984, p. 74-75) recounts a recent such debate in Germany.2
One question that arises, in considering which type of cost-shifting rule to implement,
is the effects that each type of rule has on the propensity to settle out of court and the
level of such settlements.  There has been much theoretical work in this area, mostly of
a game theoretical nature. This literature has been ambiguous. Empirical studies have
been largely non-existent because of confidentiality considerations regarding data
release. However, the underlying structure of the problem is clear and easy to specify,
making it ripe for experimental work. This line of investigation has only been taken up
on a tiny scale to date, an omission this paper sets out to rectify. The paper deals
simply with the differences between the American and British Rules with regard to
frequency and value of out-of-court settlements and is organised as follows. Section 2
takes a brief look at the literature on the subject. Section 3 outlines, in detail, the
theoretical model used, and Section 4 covers the experimental design. Section 5 gives
the experimental results and Section 6 concludes.  We use the Scottish legal terms of
pursuer and defender throughout the paper.  These are equivalent to plaintiff and
defendant.
2. The existing literature
The original approach to the question of pre-trial negotiation is due to Landes (1971),
Posner (1973) and Gould (1973). These authors concentrate on the difference between
the likely gain to the pursuer and the likely expense to the defender if a particular case
goes to trial. This bargaining range is influenced by the costs associated with going to
trial, and these costs, and hence the bargaining range, will vary with the fee-shifting
rule that is place. The above authors assume that neither the probability of the pursuer
prevailing at trial nor the total costs vary with the fee-shifting rule. The view put
forward in these papers, known as the “LPG model”, is that it is differences in
expected trial outcomes between the defenders and pursuers that leads cases to trial.
No attempt is made to determine settlement points, rather the focus is on the
settlement range and its effect on the probability of disputes ending up in court.
Shavell (1982) marks the high-point in the theoretical development of this approach.
Shavell suggests that the British rule will lower the number of trials, compared with
the American rule, if the parties are pessimistic, and the British rule will raise the
number of trials, compared with the American rule, if the parties are optimistic.
Intuitively, a party who is optimistic will favour going to court under the British rule,
as opposed to the American, as success means that the other side will pay all the costs.
In other words, optimism narrows the bargaining range under the British rule,
compared with the American rule. This has received some empirical support, e.g.
Danzon and Lillard (1983) and Hughes and Snyder (1995), discussed in more detail
below.
The LPG model can be considered and extended in the spirit of economic models of
labour disputes.  This is the approach followed by Cooter et al. (1982), Coursey and
Stanley (1988) and ourselves. Bargaining under the threat of trial generates a contract
zone that encourages (pre-trial) settlement in a similar way to Stevens’ (1966) model
of the arbitration processes within labour-employer disputes. In addition to the LPG
criterion of a difference in perceived probabilities regarding liability and damages in the3
trial outcome (directly comparable in the labour case to the arbitrator’s award), the
contract zone (or bargaining range) is formed by the court costs  (cost of arbitration)
and the effect of risk aversion. Some degree of risk aversion, on behalf of either party,
will mean that there will be some settlement that is preferred with certainty to the
prospect of trial (arbitration in the labour context). Thus, in the labour context,
changing any of the rules associated with arbitration will result in new patterns of
bargaining behaviour (Farber (1980), Farber and Katz (1979)). This approach is
directly translatable to bargaining in the shadow of the law.
In a labour economics context, Bloom (1980) points out that the existence of a
contract zone does not assure a settlement because strategic behaviour, to persuade
one’s opponent to take a lower share of the stakes, may result in a failure to settle.
The issue of strategic behaviour has also been considered in a legal context.  Here the
question of strategic behaviour arises in the choice of level of legal expenditure, or in
the use of a negotiating strategy calculated to gain more of the available surplus arising
from an out-of-court settlement, or in the use of privately held information.
Braeutigam et al. (1984) focus on the strategic choice of hours worked by legal
representatives. Increasing this choice variable increases the chances of winning the
case, but at the same time increases the costs that are faced. The authors find that total
costs are likely to be higher under the British rule but cannot draw any other firm
conclusions. Most other game-theoretical analysis has focused on the asymmetry of
information between the two sides. Salant (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
focus on asymmetric information regarding the level of damage suffered by the
pursuer, whilst Bebchuk (1984) and P'ng (1983) concentrate on asymmetric
information regarding the defender’s liability.
The strategic bargaining papers discussed above allow a ‘one-shot’ form of bargaining.
Spier (1992), on the other hand, focuses specifically on the dynamics of pre-trial
negotiating. Allowing defenders private knowledge, she finds that the probability of
settlement is high at first, then falls as negotiation continues only to rise sharply as the
date of trial approaches. This theoretical finding is verified experimentally by Roth, et
al. (1988) in a general bargaining context and is consistent with the widely recognised
proclivity for cases to settle ‘at the door of court’.  The general literature on
bargaining experiments, reviewed by Roth (1995), provides other useful insights to the
pre-trial bargaining situation, particularly in games where the stakes diminish with
every round of unsuccessful bargaining.
There has been remarkably little empirical work to either support or reject these
theoretical conclusions. This is simply due to the difficulty in generating useful data in
an area  where confidentiality is paramount. Even where data is available, jurisdictional
differences are so marked that the usual type of comparative work is fraught with
difficulty. An exception can be found in Snyder and Hughes (1990) and Hughes and
Snyder (1995)  who utilise data from a ‘natural’ experiment when the Sate of Florida
switched from the American rule to the British rule for medical malpractice litigation
between July 1980 and September 1985. They conclude that the British rule
encourages litigation but leads to more claims being dropped and more settlements
being reached as the case approaches trial. Of those cases that reach the courtroom
under the British rule, the outcomes tend to be more pro-pursuer in terms of  decisions4
on both liability and level of damages. This would tend to suggest some form of
sorting mechanism.
Given the lack of data it would seem that the area is ideally suited for experimental
work. This is an area of economics that has recently enjoyed a marked increase in
interest (see Hey (1991)). Although there are well known applications of experimental
methods in other areas of Law and Economics (e.g., tests of the Coase Theorem by
Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) and Harrison and McKee (1985)), only two papers, to
date, attempt to analyse the effect of differing cost allocation rules on pre-trial
settlement. Rowe and Vidmar (1988) use a postal questionnaire technique, which is
some distance from ideal experimental conditions. Indeed they find no statistically
significant differences, neither for frequency of settlement nor for settlement values,
and conclude that the participants are not able to distinguish the different rules.
Coursey and Stanley (1988) consider the issue3 in a laboratory setting. They consider
the American rule, the British rule, and defenders’ ability to make offers into court
(Rule 68 in the USA). Their experimental design takes the form of a ‘divide the dollar’
game (albeit with a notional $100) between a pair of participants who are unknown to
each other. Failure to agree results in an imposed settlement (drawn from either a
symmetric or non-symmetric award distribution) and costs being imposed. These
‘costs’ are $20 each under the American rule or $40 charged to the ‘loser’ under the
British rule. The participants are aware of the settlement distribution to which they are
subject. Their experimental results for frequency of settlement support the theoretical
prediction (see following section) for risk-averse participants, namely that frequency of
settlement will be higher under the British system. Their results for settlement values
are also in line with theory, in that settlement values under the British rule are higher if
the probability of pursuer victory is greater than a half.
Coursey and Stanley use four pairs of participants per session, over six sessions in
total4, with a total of 10 games in each session. This gives a total of 40 data points per
cost allocation rule per award distribution. Although not totally clear, it would appear
that different participants are used for each of the sessions. As will be seen below, in
this paper we attempt to improve on this experimental design by moving away from
the divide-the-dollar scenario to one that more clearly captures the dual hurdle of
liability and quantum of damages.  More importantly, our experimental design does
not, as Coursey and Stanley’s does, leave both protagonists facing a prospect of
gaining.  In our set-up, the defender is unambiguously looking at a loss prospect.
Tversky and Khaneman (1986) explain how decisions can be influenced by such
prospects.  Our reward mechanism for participants is also much more salient than that
used by Coursey and Stanley, and a larger number of random pairings is utilised.  Our
approach was extensively piloted before implementation (see Main (1998)).
                                                       
3 Stanley and Coursey (1990) also use experimental methods, but to analyse the case selection
hypothesis of Priest and Klein (1984).
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An examination of equation (7) shows that the span of the bargaining range is equal to
the total costs, C, in both cases. As it is the span of the bargaining range that will
determine the frequency of settlement, there should be no difference in frequency
between the two rules6. The difference in the value of settlements depends on the trial
probability, p. If p is greater than a half then the value of settlements will be greater
(more pro-pursuer) under the British rule, and vice versa.
The above analysis has assumed risk neutrality. If either of the players is risk-averse
then the predictions of the theory change. The British rule, because the level of costs
faced depends on the probability of the case being won (or lost), is intrinsically more
risky than the American rule. Regardless of the probability of winning, risk averse
defenders will offer higher settlements than suggested by equation (7) and risk averse
pursuers will offer lower settlements. This is due to a willingness to trade off a higher
expected return for certainty. In either case, the bargaining range is widened increasing
the frequency of settlement.
The effect of risk aversion on differences in settlement values between the two regimes
is harder to predict. It depends on the relationship between the level of risk aversion
and the trial probability. For example, if p is greater than a half and therefore the value
of settlements to the pursuer (under risk neutrality) is greater under the British rule,
this difference over the American rule may be negated by strong risk aversion on the
part of the pursuer lowering the lower bound to the bargaining range. Of course,
equivalently, strong risk aversion on the part of the defender may increase the upper
bound of the range leading to upward pressure on the settlement values. The effect is
theoretically indeterminate. In practice where defenders are most often repeat players
and are able to spread any risk (e.g., insurance companies), then it is usually the single-
shot pursuer (e.g., a personal injury victim) who is relatively risk averse7.
4. Experimental Design
Before going into detail about the design of the experiments, it is useful to clarify the
terminology used. We refer to each individual bid passed between players as a round, a
particular negotiation exercise as a game, the games played by a group of participants
as a session, and an organised number of sessions taken together as the experiment.
The total experiment is divided into two sessions of two hours each with fourteen
different participants being present in each session. In each session participants play a
mixture of the two cost allocation rules. This set-up is designed with three points in
mind.  The first is simple practicality (the number of available spaces and other
                                                       
6Again this assumes risk neutrality.
7 It should be noted that in cases that may set a precedent for future action (for instance suits against
tobacco companies) the defender may be extremely risk averse.8
logistical considerations).  The second is that it due to risk preference considerations it
is preferable to have each participant play both cost regimes.  Thirdly, this set-up
enables us to vary the order in which games of each cost allocation type are played.
This allows us to investigate whether starting with a particular cost allocation rule has
an impact on the results. There are eight games played in each session and two
sessions each of fourteen participants (forming seven pairs in any given game). This
gives us a total of 96 data points. The order of play in each session is shown in Table 1
below, where B refers to a British rule game and A to an American.
[ Table 1 about here]
The participants are all undergraduate students in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the
University of Edinburgh, and within each session there are an equal number of male
and female participants.  The experimental participants are divided at the beginning of
each session into two types - the first represent the defenders (D) and the second
represent the pursuers (P).  Each participant plays as the same type throughout the
session. In each negotiation game the participants are paired anonymously at random.
This is to ensure that there is no opportunity for learning or signalling regarding future
behaviour.
To avoid income effects as the games progress, the payment mechanism is such that at
the end of the session a single game is chosen at random from those played and
payments are made based on that game.  This payment mechanism is in contrast with
Coursey and Stanley (1988) who use a cumulative total of all results (with a
correspondingly small metric for conversion from game money to actual money).
There are strong suggestions in the literature on experiments in economics that the
income or wealth effects that arise from such a payment mechanism may strongly
influence the behaviour of the participants (see Davis and Holt, 1993, pp. 449-452).
In addition each participant is give a small attendance fee, regardless of their
performance.
In comparison with Coursey and Stanley (1988) whose experimental design is basically
a ‘dividing the dollar’ game (Binmore (1992)), and ‘going to trial’ is represented by a
single probability distribution, we present a more realistic portrayal of the negotiating
situation. The trial process is modelled in two stages. There is a certain probability, p,
that each case will be won by the pursuer, and for those cases that are successful the
level of damages is determined by a probability distribution, F. Although it is possible
to represent such a set-up by a single distribution, it was thought to be more intuitive
to separate the two processes. The exact nature of p and F and the way in which they
are represented to participants is discussed later in this section.
Each of the defenders is given a starting amount for each game (a notional £14000 for
defenders and a notional £4000 for pursuers). They are informed that their aim is to
keep as much of this amount as possible. This starting amount is equal to the
maximum damages that can be awarded plus the maximum costs. This is to ensure that
the defenders can not be left with a negative amount within any game and hence at the
end of the session. The pursuers goal is to try and maximise the amount they receive
from the defenders. However, if the case goes to trial and the pursuers loses then they9
are liable for costs. Again to avoid the possibility of a player having a negative return
for a single game and perhaps the session, the pursuers are given a starting amount
equal to the maximum costs.
The above arrangement represents the most crucial improvement in our design over
that of Coursey and Stanley (1988).  In their divide-the-dollar type of approach, both
participants to the negotiation have a prospect of gaining resources (at worst they get
nothing).  In civil litigation, of course, the defender has the perspective (or prospect, in
the terms of Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) of loss.  At best the defender will loose
nothing but there is a strong possibility ( 0.75 in this experiment) that a loss will be
sustained and no chance of ending up with more than at the start of the process.  On
the other hand, the pursuer has, in general, a gains perspective (or prospect).  There is
a chance (0.25 in this experiment) that the process will leave them out of pocket to the
tune of the legal costs of both parties, but there is also a chance that they will make a
gain, and the general expectation is one of gain.  By ensuring that the participants in
the experiment have at the outset of each game the appropriate endowments of money
(which they understand translates to cash payments at the end of the experiment, in the
ratio of £1000 notional money for £1 in cash) we hope to engender a closer
representation of the behaviour of actual litigants.
Both types of players are given full information as to the way the game is to be played,
the trial probability, and the settlement distribution. The documentation varies slightly
between player type8, but mainly to give the appropriate perspective of pursuer and
defender. The parameters of the experiment, p and F, are chosen for maximum
simplicity. The probability of any particular case being won by the pursuer is 0.75 and
the settlement distribution, F, is a uniform distribution of £6000, £7000, £8000, £9000
and £10000. The average settlement is thus £8000 but with probability of 0.75 giving
an expected level of damages of £6000. As mentioned above, the defenders are given a
credit of a notional £14000 and the pursuers a notional £4000 to start each game. This
ensures that no negative outcomes can take place.  As has been explained above, each
notional £1000 translates into £1 in real cash payments.
On a practical level, negotiation takes place via a shared bidding sheet for each pair in
each game. Two clerks are employed to pass these sheets between the players. One
clerk covers the defenders, collecting sheets and delivering them as appropriate via a
central in-out tray. A similar system is employed for the pursuers. Each sheet is
labelled with a the defender and pursuer number the identities of which are not known
to the participants. Although this system is not perfect it is designed to be a trade-off
between anonymity preservation and convenience. Each game lasts five minutes and a
countdown of this time is displayed to participants throughout each game.  To ensure
that participants are familiar with the mechanics of the experiment, in terms of making
and receiving bids and so on, two practice games are conducted before the eight on
which the results (and participant payments) are based.  While participants are aware
that they are negotiating under a time constraint, the post-experiment debriefing
questionnaire does not reveal any problem with the bidding mechanism9.  Over the
                                                       
8 This documentation is available can be found on the World Wide Web at
http://www.ed.ac.uk/~econ/main.html
9 Save to produce the obvious suggestion that an electronic form of offer exchange would be quicker.10
eight games reported, the average number of bids or offers submitted between pairs of
negotiators is 6.3 with a range from 1 to 11.  For those reaching the time constraint
without settling, the average number of bids is 8.3 with a range between 2 and 11.
The opportunity to make the first proposal of settlement alternates from game to game
between defender and pursuer.
The trial outcome of each game is determined in two stages for those pairs of
participants who do not settle10. A roulette wheel is spun to determine the judgement.
Ignoring the zero, a number between 1 and 9 represents a ‘win’ for the defender in the
sense that the pursuer’s case is rejected, and any other number a ‘win’ for the pursuer.
If the pursuer wins, the level of damages is then determined by drawing a ball from a
bingo cage containing equal numbers of balls representing each of the five possible
damage levels. This is done in front of the participants at the end of each game.
Finally, at the end of the each session the roulette wheel is used to select at random
one of the eight games, and the participants receive payment, in cash, based on their
outcome for that game (divided by 1000) plus their attendance fee of £5.  The possible
payments ranged from £5 to £23 per person11 and the actual payments ranged between
£10.50 and £17.50 with an average of £13.07.
The participants are asked to fill out a questionnaire12 which includes a question of the
form:
How much would you be prepared to pay, here and now, for the chance
of winning £10 on the toss of a fair coin?
The purpose of this question is to measure the participants risk preferences as the
predictions of the theoretical model are dependant on the view that the participants
take over risk. An answer of £5, the price of a ‘fair’ gamble, would go some way to
indicating risk neutrality.  An alternative would be to follow Roth and Malouf (1979)
and induce risk neutrality by making the payoffs in numbers of lottery tickets, where
the number of lottery tickets earned increases the chances of winning a known prize in
a later lottery.  This was felt to add excessive complication to an already complex
situation.
                                                                                                                                                             
The software for such a procedure is now under development.
10 Did not settle either because they ran out of time before reaching a settlement or because one or
other party chose to ‘go to court’.
11 The figure of £23 refers to the total money available.  For such a payment to be made, it would
mean that a participant was willing to give away their initial allocation in reaching an out of court
settlement. An alternative figure for the maximum payout is £19 which represents the ‘best’ possible
court result to one of the sides.
12 Available at: http://www.ed.ac.uk/~econ/main.html11
5. Results
The theoretical section of this paper clearly shows that the results of any experiment
will be dependant on the risk preferences of the participants. It is thus advisable to
examine these risk preferences before turning to any results. Table 2 shows the
responses to the risk aversion question detailed above. All figures are bid levels in £’s.
A bid of £5 indicates risk neutrality. The table is divided by session and player type.
There is a discrepancy in reported amounts between each player type and session.
However, the validity of the somewhat naive question is in doubt. The bids of £9.00
and £6.50 would seem to indicate extreme risk seeking behaviour or more likely a
misunderstanding of the question. The zero bid was complete with a note: ‘I don’t
gamble’ and the two 0.01 bids were accompanied by the comment that ‘It doesn’t
matter what you bid - should just bid as low as possible’ - which on one interpretation
of the question wording is perfectly true. We would very tentatively suggest that there
was considerable risk aversion and that it was more pronounced for the players in the
second session.
[ Table 2 about here]
The basic results are presented in Table 3 which shows the total number of
settlements, f, under the two cost allocation rules - the American (fA) and the British
(fB) and some basic summary statistics on the value of the settlements, Y, again for
the two rules.  The values of those settlements reached under the two rules are shown
in Figure 1.  The higher average settlement under the British rule (£8114) as against
the American rule (£6912) is clearly visible here.  The settlements at £10000 and
£11000 under the British rule may reflect the pursuer being able to exploit some
bargaining advantage owing to the uncertainty regarding the allocation of the £4000
legal costs.  Recall that the expected range of settlement under the American rule is
£4000 to £8000 (mean of £6000) and under the British rule is £5000 to £9000 (mean
of £7000).
[ Table 3 about here]
[ Figure 1 about here]
 As was detailed in an earlier section, the frequency of settlement under the two cost
allocation rules should be the same if the participants are risk neutral. We test the null
hypothesis that the frequency of settlements under the American rule (fA) is equal to
the frequency of settlements under the British rule (fB) using a Fisher Exact Test and a
Chi-square test13. The results are presented in Table 4.  It can be seen here that it is
not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the frequency of settlement is the same
under the two cost allocation rules. This would seem to suggest that our risk aversion
                                                       
13 See Siegal and Castellan (1988), p. 103 and p. 111 for details of these tests.  The Fisher Exact test
(or, more fully, the Fisher Exact Probability Test) emerges directly as a prob. value.  STATA is used
throughout.12
question has overstated the degree of risk aversion present.
[ Table 4 about here]
Turning to the location of the settlement point, under risk neutrality we would expect
the value of the settlements reached under the American rule (YA) to be smaller than
those reached under the British. A cursory glance at Table 3 would seem to confirm
this and Table 5 presents Student t and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney14 (ranksum) tests of
the null hypothesis that the value of the settlements is the same under each rule against
the alternate hypothesis that the value of settlements under the British rule (YB) is
larger. Table 5 also presents a Kruksal-Wallis15 test against the alternative hypothesis
that the settlements are different.  So in all cases we find we reject the null hypothesis
that the settlement levels are equal. Considering Tables 4 and 5, it would appear that
the experimental results are consistent with those of the theory, with the average
settlement under the American rule being £6912 which is within the predicted range of
£4000 to £8000, and significantly below the average settlement of £8114 under the
British rule, which is itself within the predicted range of £5000 to £9000.
[ Table 5 about here]
Taking things further, however, it is hypothesised that the starting player in each game
may be able to exert an influence over the eventual result by making a starting bid that
‘frames’ or ‘anchors’ the subsequent negotiation in the game. The importance of the
opening bid is a recurring theme in the negotiation literature (see Lewicki and Litterer
(1985)). The starting player alternates in each game giving a total of 4 games in each
cost allocation regime where each type of player starts. It is thus possible to test
whether there are differences between the frequency and value of the settlements
reached when different types of player have the first bid. The frequency of settlement
when player type j (j=D, P) have first bid under cost regime i (i=A, B) is denoted by fi
j
and the settlement values by Yi
j
. Table 6 shows the number of settlements under these
cases.
A chi-square test of the null hypothesis, that the number of settlements is invariant
with both cost regime and order against the alternative hypothesis that it is, gives a
value of 0.7966 (3df) which against a critical value of 7.82, at a significance level of
5%, allows us to safely accept the null. It would thus appear that the frequency of
settlement is not affected by who goes first.
[ Table 6 about here]
In a similar vein, Table 7 shows the mean settlement levels, Y, for those cases that do
settle for each order of play under the two cost regimes.  Table 8 shows statistical tests
(student t, Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon and Kruksal-Wallis) of the null hypotheses that
the order of play does not make a difference to the settlement values against the
alternative hypothesis that order does make a difference.
                                                       
14 Siegal and Castellan (1988) p 87
15 Siegal and Castellan (1988) p. 20613
[ Tables 7 and 8 about here]
Neither of the null hypotheses is rejected by any of the tests. Thus we have the
situation where order of play does not have a significant impact on either the
frequency or level of settlement.
The experimental design
The results analysed so far would seem to indicate a successful experimental design in
that the outcomes are consistent with theory.  However, it is important to check
further for the influence of the experimental design on the results. It will be recalled
from Section 4, that the order in which the cost allocation rules are played is varied for
each session, and in each session three games of one type are followed by three of the
other and then by two of the original (see Table 1).
It is possible, therefore, to test whether this change in order of playing the two cost
allocation rules has an effect on the results, and whether the experimental process or
experience affects behaviour -- are the results for the first three games played in each
session equal to the last two (the first three and last two games in each session being
the same cost allocation rule)?  It must be remembered that dividing the data in this
way dramatically reduces our sample sizes and consequently decreases the power of
any statistical tests.  Table 9 shows the frequency and mean settlements under the two
cost allocation rules by session. Figures in brackets show the proportion in each
category. The British rule is played first in session one and the American rule first in
session two.
[ Table 9 about here]
The frequency of settlement in the two sessions is analysed in Table 10 and the null
hypothesis that there is no difference is accepted in all cases. Considering risk aversion
and assuming our risk aversion results are reliable, there could well be proportionally
more British rule settlements in session two. Table 10 shows there is no statistically
significant difference between these settlement proportions.  The settlement
proportions are, to all intents and purposes, identical.
[ Table 10 about here]
A cursory examination of Table 9 shows that for both cost allocation rules the
settlement values are higher for session one than for session two.  The first part of
Table 11 tests the null hypothesis that the settlement values under each cost allocation
rule in each session are different (YA
1
 represents the value of settlements made under
the American rule in session 1). The lower part of Table 11 tests the null hypothesis
that the cost allocation rules produce the same settlement in each session.
[ Table 11 about here]14
From the top part of Table 11, we are forced to reject the hypothesis that the
settlement values, for each cost regime, are equal across the two sessions. However,
from the lower part of Table 11, there is still a significant difference between the
settlement values under different cost regimes in the two sessions. It must be noted
however that this difference is much less marked than when the two sessions were
considered together. This is due to the fact that the first session, for which settlement
values were higher for both rules, contained more British rule games than the second
session (five as opposed to three).  The second session, for which settlement values
were lower for both rules, contained more American rule games. This distorted the
average British rule settlement (over the two sessions) upwards towards the higher
average in session one and the average American rule settlement (over the two
sessions) downwards towards the lower average in session two16. It should be
repeated though, that taking the sessions separately, we still find significant differences
between the value of settlements under the two cost regimes, and this difference is
consistent with the theory outlined in section 3.
Returning to the question of risk aversion, as elicited by our questionnaire, the
defenders in session two were the least risk neutral group. However, risk aversion has
not seemed to influence any of the previous results. An alternative explanation for this
difference between sessions must lie in the order in which the cost allocation rules
were played. The participants in each session, although different, were selected at
random, assigned to their roles randomly and received the same instructions.  An
examination of the settlements reached by each player does not show any obvious
discrepancies i.e. there was no ‘rogue’ player in either session who could be held to
account for the differences.  The first session started with the British rule which, as we
have shown, results in higher settlements than the American rule. It must be surmised
that this anchored17 all subsequent negotiation in the session, and that the opposite
process took place in the second session. This would give generally higher settlements
in the first session and generally lower settlements in the second.
Finally, Tables 12 and 13 tests for ‘return to type’ effects. As shown in Table 1, the
game type (cost regime) played at the start of each session was returned to at the end
of the particular session. We test that there is no significant difference between the
frequency of settlement, shown in Table 12, and the settlement values, in Table 13,
between the first three and last two games in session one (all British rule) and the first
three and last two games in session two (all American rule).
[ Tables 12 and 13 about here]
An examination of Table 12 indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
frequency of settlement is the same across these games. Similarly, Table 13 indicates
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the value of settlements is the same
across these games. It would therefore appear that the participants did indeed ‘return
                                                       
16 A comparison of the relevant sections of tables 3 and 9 shows that the overall mean settlement
value for the American rule (6912) is closer to the average in session 2 (6309) than in session 1
(8115) and that the overall mean settlement value for the British Rule (8114) is closer to the average
in session 1 (8881) than in session 2 (6964).
17 See Tversky and Kahneman (1986)15
to type’ and played the same strategy for the identical games at the beginning and end
of each session.
Conclusion
This paper has analysed the effect of the post-trial cost allocation regime, either British
(the loser pays) or American (own costs), on the frequency and value of pre-trial
settlements. Well established theoretical models suggest that, assuming risk neutrality,
there should be no difference in the frequency of settlement between the two regimes
but that when settlements do take place and the probability of the pursuer winning is
high then the settlement values should be higher under the British rule than the
American. This is due to the fact that in the case of the British rule the defender has
more to lose (and the pursuer more to gain) than under the American rule. Hence the
bargaining range (of potential pre-trial settlements), although of the same magnitude as
under the American rule, will span a higher range of value under the British rule.
We find that our experimental results are consistent with the predictions of the theory,
assuming rationality and risk neutrality. We also find that the nature of the
experimental design has a measurable influence on the results. The set-up used, of the
defender-type players starting with a given amount in each game which the pursuer-
type players must try to gain, would seem to be a more realistic framework than a
‘divide the dollar’ game.  In our design, the defender starts with an endowment that
will be diminished by any settlement or pro-pursuer trial decision.  Under the
alternative (e.g., as used by Coursey and Stanley, 1988) both players are presented
with a gains perspective, and this is not representative of the real world situation and,
as Tversky and Kahneman (1986) remind us, may lead to different behaviour.
While theory suggests that the risk preferences of the participants may have a major
influence on the outcome, our risk preference measurement does not capture this
effect. As measured, we seem to have risk-averse participants but the bulk of our
results are consistent with risk neutrality. If we discount this issue, we find that the
order in which participants play games within the two cost allocation rules seems to
have an impact on the outcome. Participants who begin with the British rule make
higher settlements than those who start with the American rule. We hypothesise that
this is due to the initial rule that is played leading to anchoring of the remainder of the
session. This means that care must be taken with the design of experiments of this type
and our approach of using multiple inverse sessions should continue to be
implemented, but extended to include an equal number of games of each type per
session.
As the Woolf and the Cullen Reports have indicated (and as echoed in the debate that
these reports have inspired), there is a perception that civil justice is too slow and too
expensive.  In order to encourage more out-of-court settlements in disputes, some
commentators have looked to the cost-shifting regime.  In this light, some jurisdictions
(e.g., Florida) have gone as far as changing the cost regime that applied for certain
classes of suit.  In other areas18, devices such as Federal Rule 68 and California Rule
                                                       
18 For a discussion of these alternative variations, see Anderson (1996).16
998 move the cost-shifting regime in the direction of loser pays (the British rule) and
away from each party paying their own costs.  The experimental evidence presented
above suggests that with respect to a choice between the British rule and the American
rule, in cases that are enjoined in litigation or dispute, the propensity to settle before
trial is not influenced by the adoption of one rule or the other.  This is because the
settlement range is unaltered.  But the level of settlement is affected.  Pursuers with
high (greater than 0.5) probability of success at trial benefit in terms of achieving a
more generous settlement.  This result is confirmed by our statistical tests of the
results presented above.  With a low probability (less than 0.5) of success, the result is
reversed.
The results conform well with the Landes-Posner-Gould model of pre-trial negotiation
as developed by Shavell (1982).  The failure to reach a pre-trial settlement in some
30% of the cases can be seen as a manifestation of strategic bargaining.  Such strategic
behaviour will assume additional importance when procedural arrangements such as
judicial offers (or “tenders”) are introduced.  Under such arrangements a trial outcome
that finds against the defender but where the damages award is less generous than one
already tabled by the defender in the pre-trial negotiation leads to costs19 being
awarded against the pursuer (who has “failed to beat the offer”).  But this topic is left
to a later investigation.
The general conclusion that emerges from the results presented above is a shift from
American to British rule produces no discernible impact on the propensity to settle.
There is, however, a significant, if empirically modest, shift in bargaining power
towards the pursuer under the English rule when the probability of success at trial is
high.  As with all experimental evidence, it is necessary to interpret these findings with
some caution.  But the numbers used had relative magnitudes that were dimensionally
sensible in terms of the ratio of legal costs to damages, and the participants faced
monetary incentives that were reasonably high.  If nothing else, these results suggest
that policy makers would be wise not to expect too much when changing the basis on
which legal costs are allocated after trials.
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Table 1 - Cost allocation rule by game number and session
Game Number
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 B B B A A A B B
2 A A A B B B A A
Table 2 – Willingness to pay for a £10 gamble (50:50 chance of winning)
Session 1 Session 2
Player Number Defenders Pursuers Defenders Pursuers
1 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 5.00 5.00 0.01 4.00
3 1.00 5.00 0.01 4.50
4 2.00 3.00 6.50 2.00
5 2.00 9.00 0.00 5.00
6 4.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
7 5.00 3.00 4.00 2.00
Average 3.00 3.86 1.93 2.93
Session Average 3.43 2.43
Table 3 - Basic Results
Cost Allocation Mechanism
American British Total
No. of Settlements (f) 39 35 74
No. of ‘Gone to Trial’ 17 21 38
Total 56 56 112
Value of settlements (Y)
Mean (m) 6912 8114




Table 4 - Analysis of frequency of settlement
   Hypothesis Test Statistic Critical
Value (5%)
Probability Conclusion
Ho: fA=fB Fisher Exact - - 0.550 Accept Ho
H1: fA„fB Chi-square (df=1) 0.6373 3.84 0.425 Accept Ho
Table 5 - Analysis of settlement points

















3.84 0.0006 Reject Ho











No of Settlements (f) 20 19 18 17
No of ‘Gone to Trial’ 8 9 10 1122











Mean settlement 6693 7142 8308 7909
Std. Dev. 966 1408 1455 1484
Table 8 - Tests of equality of settlements by cost regime and order.







1.96 0.2502 Accept Ho
Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney
1.08 1.96 0.2794 Accept Ho
Kruksal-Wallis 1.170
(1df)





2.04 0.4271 Accept Ho
Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney
0.86 1.96 0.3908 Accept Ho
Kruksal-Wallis 0.736
(1df)
3.84 0.3908 Accept Ho













13 (62%) 26 (74%) 21 (60%) 14 (67%)
No. of ‘Gone to
Trial’
8 (28%) 9 (26%) 14 (40%) 7 (33%)
Total 21 (100%) 35 (100%) 35 (100%) 21
Mean settlement 8115 6309 8881 6964
Std. Dev. 820 872 1244 91123
Table 10 - Analysis of frequency of settlement by session
Hypothesis Test Statistic Critical
Value (5%)
Probability Conclusion
Ho: fA1=fA2 Fisher Exact - - 0.378 Accept Ho
H1: fA1„fA2 Chi-square (df=1) 0.9516 3.84 0.329 Accept Ho
Ho: fB1=fB2 Fisher Exact - - 0.777 Accept Ho
H1: fB1„fB2 Chi-square (df=1) 0.2489 3.84 0.618 Accept Ho
Table 11 - Tests of equality of settlements by cost regime and session.







1.96 0.0000 Reject Ho
Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney
4.41 1.96 0.0001 Reject Ho
Kruksal-Wallis 19.441
(1df)





2.04 0.0000 Reject Ho
Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney
3.94 1.96 0.0001 Reject Ho
Kruksal-Wallis 15.520
(1df)





1.96 0.0582 Accept Ho
Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney
2.02 1.96 0.0434 Reject Ho
Kruksal-Wallis 4.080
(1df)





2.04 0.0318 Reject Ho
Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney
2.11 1.96 0.0346 Reject Ho
Kruksal-Wallis 4.463
(1df)
3.84 0.0346 Reject Ho24
Table 12 - Analysis of return to type effect on frequency of settlement





Fisher Exact - - 1.00 Accept Ho
H1:  fB1,2,31„
fB7,81
Chi-square (df=1) 0.0794 3.84 0.778 Accept Ho
Ho: fA1,2,31=
fA7,81
Fisher Exact - - 0.712 Accept Ho
H1:  fA1,2,31„
fA7,81
Chi-square (df=1) 0.2489 3.84 0.636 Accept Ho
Table 13 - Analysis of return to type effect on value of settlements












0.11 1.96 0.9135 Accept Ho
Kruksal-Wallis 19.012
(1df)










1.19 1.96 0.2326 Accept Ho
Kruksal-Wallis 1.425
(1df)
3.84 0.2326 Accept Ho